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This paper studies the incentive issues associated with self-enforcing stochastic monitoring in a model
of investment and production. The efficient contract features a debt-like payment with a threshold
in terms of the reported output in which all of the reported output is taken up to the threshold if monitoring
doesn't occur and all of the output is taken if monitoring does occur. An output report above the threshold
leads to zero probability of monitoring and just the threshold amount being paid out. The efficiency
gap between the self-enforcing contract and the commitment constraint is minimized when the monitors
hold no part of the residual claim on the firm, which we associate with equity. Misreporting by the









This paper studies the incentive issues associated with stochastic monitoring in a model of
investment and production. In the model outside investors hire a manager in order to run a
project and produce output. The output of this project is subject to a short-run information
friction and a longer-run agency friction. The agency friction motivates the outside investors
to try and extract their funds early, while the information friction makes it easier to extract
their funds later. The optimal extraction process is determined by a trade-o⁄ between
these two factors. Just as in Townsend (1979), monitoring can be used to overcome the
information friction, both because it allows the investors to see the actual output when they
monitor and to encourage more accurate reporting when they don￿ t. However, monitoring
is ex post ine¢ cient since it involves dead weight losses. This ex post ine¢ ciency makes it
di¢ cult to generate the right incentives with respect to the monitors when we require it to
be self-enforcing.
The analysis of the impact of self-enforcing monitoring builds o⁄ of a recent paper by
Atkeson and Cole (2005) (AC). They showed that a model with a temporary information
friction, an agency friction and deterministic monitoring could generate two distinct payment
streams within each period, an interim debt-like payment and a residual equity-like payment,
along with a theory of executive compensation. But, like many papers in the literature, AC
left unanswered the question of which payments should and should not be bundled together
and the extent to which their results depended upon deterministic monitoring.1 Here we
show that e¢ ciently generating the correct monitoring incentives motivates the separation
of debt and equity claims in order to restrict the monitors to only hold debt claims. We also
show that AC￿ s results carry over to a stochastic monitoring context.
For monitoring to be self-enforcing, the monitors must obtain a ￿nancial bene￿t from
monitoring which covers their costs. This necessitates a wedge between the interim or debt
payout when monitoring occurs and when it does not occur. We show that it￿ s easy to
construct a self-enforcing contract that supports the e¢ cient outcome obtained under com-
mitment when monitoring is deterministic and the expected value of the debt payment is big
enough. However, when the debt payment is not big enough additional costly liquid funds
have to be invested into the ￿rm in order to compensate the monitors at the commitment
level of debt. This introduces a trade-o⁄ into the model between the size of the debt and
the amount of liquid funds that must be invested into the ￿rm. Since increasing the size of
1DeMarzo and Fishman (2003) also construct a model in which the optimal contract can be split into
three pieces, outside debt, outside equity, and a credit line. Here too there is no fundamental reason for this
division.
2the debt means increasing the extent of monitoring, both adjustments are costly. We show
that having the monitors only hold debt claims on the ￿rm reduces the minimum debt level
below which costly funds must be invested while also reducing the extent to which costly
liquid funds need to be invested when the level of debt is below this threshold.
We allow for stochastic monitoring because it can be used to minimize the extent of
monitoring su¢ cient to generate the correct incentives with respect to managerial reporting.
Stochastic monitoring exacerbates the incentive problem of the monitors relative to deter-
ministic monitoring because the probability with which the monitors are suppose to monitor
conveys information about the state of the ￿rm. This tightening of the incentive friction
for the monitors means that the e¢ cient stochastic monitoring contract with commitment
is not self-enforcing. We characterize the self-enforcing stochastic monitoring contract and
show that despite allowing for stochastic monitoring and the additional incentive constraint
that monitoring be self-enforcing, the general nature of the results in AC go through. There
still is a debt-like payment with a threshold in terms of the reported output in which all of
the reported output is taken up to the threshold if monitoring doesn￿ t occur and all of the
output is taken if monitoring does occur. An output report above the threshold leads to
zero probability of monitoring and just the threshold amount being paid out. Just as with
deterministic monitoring, we ￿nd that the e¢ ciency gap between the self-enforcing contract
and the commitment constraint is minimized when the monitors holds no part of the resid-
ual claim on the ￿rm, which we associate with equity. Hence, the bundling together of the
payouts that we associate with debt and equity is ine¢ cient in this model, and our results
provide an answer for separating the payouts of the ￿rm into debt and equity.
Our results on the e¢ ciency of multiple claims on the ￿rm is similar in spirit to ￿ndings
of Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) and Berglof and von Thadden (1994) who ￿nd that there
is an optimal distribution of short-term vs. long-term claims within models of complete
but noncontractible information. In their models short-term claims are better able to insist
on liquidation in bad intermediate output states or if short-term payments are not made
because they have stronger bargaining position ex post. They ￿nd that the right combina-
tion of short-term and longer-term claims helps to generate the appropriate choice of ￿rm
liquidation, which in turn generates the correct incentives for debt payments. Our result is
complementary to theirs in that it shows that getting monitoring incentives right generates
a more extreme prediction that the monitors should only hold debt claims on the ￿rm.2
2Maskin and Tirole (1999) argues that the noncontractible information assumption is problematic since
there are simple games that can in e⁄ect elicit this information. This assumption is particularly contentious
in this context since one could o⁄er the debt holders the option of a long-term claim on the ￿rm if their
short-term claim was not paid o⁄. If they can sell this claim at a value that re￿ ects the true state of the
world, then this elicits the noncontractible information.
3There is another important di⁄erence between the contract with self-enforcing monitoring
relative to complete enforcement. First, misreporting of output is now an important element
in supporting the e¢ cient outcome, and occurs with positive probability. It is these misre-
ports which generate the ￿nancial gains to the monitors from monitoring, and hence leads
them to have an incentive to monitor. In equilibrium there are sanctioned misreports which
are being used to satisfy the incentive constraint of the monitors, and nonsanctioned misre-
ports. Sanctioned misreports, which are suppose to occur in equilibrium, are not punished in
an ex ante sense since the manager must be indi⁄erent between truthtelling and misreporting
in equilibrium. Nonsanctioned misreports on the other hand must be punished. These pre-
dictions with respect to the frequency and treatment of misreporting are loosely consistent
with the empirical evidence. Kedia and Philippon (2006) document that many ￿rms have
had to revise their ￿nancial statements. These restatements can be extremely large, as in
the well known case of Enron. While very large restatements, such as in case of Enron, do
involve strong sanctions against the ￿rm￿ s management, small misreports seems to involve
little or no punishment for management.
This paper is related to related to a wide literature on the optimal ￿nancial contract
between outside investors and a manager in the presence of both information and agency
frictions when there is the possibility of monitoring. The model considered here is most
closely related to AC. Aspects of the information and monitoring components are similar to
Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985),3 and aspects of the agency friction and the
information friction are similar to Hart and Moore (1995).4 Also as in AC, the inclusion of
both frictions and monitoring, and the speci￿c form of these friction leads to three di⁄erent
payment streams coming out of the ￿rm, outside debt, outside equity, and managerial com-
pensation. However, unlike AC, our model provides a rationale for why the outside claims
cannot be combined into one.
This paper is also related to the literature on optimal stochastic monitoring and opti-
mal self-enforcing monitoring. Mookherjee and Png (1989), and Border and Sobel (1987)
characterize e¢ cient stochastic auditing models with commitment.5 An important di⁄er-
ence between their models and this one is that in the absence of monitoring, the principal
never sees the output level of the agent. Hence, the information problem is persistent, and
3Also related are Wang￿ s (2004) dynamic costly-state-veri￿cation model and Williamson￿ s (1987) model
of monitoring with investment indivisibilities and equilibrium credit rationing.
4As in Jenson (1986) debt acts as a means of avoiding the agency friction associated with leaving funds
in the ￿rm and awaiting their payout as dividends.
5Other examples include Monnet and Quintin (2005), who consider a repeated version of Border and
Sobel￿ s model. Aiyagari and Alvarez (1995) considers the long-run implications of monitoring in a model of
stochastic income.
4not transient as the one we study here. This leads to substantial di⁄erences in the models
predictions on optimal compensation. Khalil (1997) considers a model in which there is
production and stochastic auditing. He shows that the lack of commitment leads to the
increased likelihood of an audit occurring.
2 Model
There is a collection of risk neutral outside investors who are endowed with a production
technology that transforms the labor of a manager into output. There are a large number
of identical risk averse managers. These managers have an outside opportunity that o⁄ers
them utility U0: The investors hire a single manager in order to run their project and promise
him at least his ex ante opportunity cost.
The production process takes place over the course of three sub-periods within the period.
In the ￿rst sub-period, a manager is chosen to operate the production technology. The
contract being entered into between the investors and the manager is also determined at this
point in time and any funds to be invested in the ￿rm are put in. We will assume that funds
invested between the ￿rst and third subperiods earn the market rate of return, but that
liquid funds, which can be withdrawn in the second subperiod, earn a lower rate of return
due to their higher liquidity. The per unit net cost of liquid funds invested in the ￿rm is ￿.
In the second sub-period, the production technology yields stochastic output ￿ which is
temporarily private information to the manager. The outside investors can ask the manager
for a report as to the value of output and then choose whether or not to monitor the output
of the project to learn the realization of ￿: This monitoring comes at the cost of ￿ units of
output. After making the monitoring decision, the investors can require an interim payment
from the manager. The advantage of monitoring is that they can take all of the output of
the ￿rm, while if they don￿ t monitor they can only take what the manager says is the output
of the ￿rm. We will allow the monitoring decision, conditional on the reported output of
the ￿rm, to be stochastic. We will assume that any report made by the manager is public
information. We will also assume that any output not paid out in the second subperiod is
reinvested in the ￿rm.
In the third subperiod, the outside investors can freely observe the output of the ￿rm
in the second subperiod ￿: However, the manager can threaten to quit at this point. If
the manager quits, the value of the resources invested in the ￿rm, which here is simply the
carried over output plus the liquid funds from the previous subperiod, will fall by the factor
5￿.6 This fall represents the loss that occurs because they didn￿ t bene￿t from the manager￿ s
input. Long-term ￿nancial assets of the ￿rm don￿ t require the manager￿ s input and aren￿ t
e⁄ected by his quitting. The manager can use the threat of quitting to try to renegotiate his
salary. At the end of the third subperiod, all remaining output and funds, after compensating
the manager, are paid to the outside investors, and consumption for both the manager and
the outside investors takes place.
Timing within the Period
Subperiod 1 Subperiod 2 Subperiod 3
i) hire the manager i) ￿ realized i) ￿ public
ii) contract ii) manager reports ii) renegotiate ?
iii) invest iii) monitor or not iii) pay manager
iv) interim payment iv) residual paid out
The set of possible output realizations, ￿; is discrete, includes 0 as its lower support and
has a ￿nite upper support. The distribution of these shocks has c.d.f. P with density p and
an expected value of one. The outside investors are risk neutral, while the manager is risk
averse with preferences given by Efu(c)g where u0(0) = 1 and u(0) = 0:
Enforcement: We will assume that the enforcement technology with respect to con-
tracts is limited in ways that are designed to mimic keys aspects of actual contract enforce-
ment. First, contracts can always be renegotiated if both parties agreed to the new contract.
Second, the manager can always quit. Third, none of the parties can be forced to put in
additional funds, so either the parties have an incentive to make these payments, or the all
funds have to invested up front.7
Wage Renegotiation: These limitations on the enforcement technology can be used
by the manager to demand higher compensation. The outside investors cannot commit to
not renegotiating and the manager cannot commit to not quit. Hence, the manager can use
the threaten of quitting to renegotiate his wage and thereby extract some part of reduction
in value that his quitting will cause. For simplicity, we will assume that he has all the
bargaining power in this renegotiation and can extract the full value of the loss associated
with his quitting. The manager will ￿nd it optimal to do this whenever his promised wages,
which are paid at the end of the third subperiod, are below the level he can extract through
6The assumption that the liquid funds are subject to this fall in value turns out to be essentially equivalent
to assuming that the manager has control over which funds are used to pay the interim payment - either
liquid funds or output. See the discussion in footnote 6 and footnote 9.
7One reason for this last requirement is that claims need to be transferable and can always be transfered
to an agent with limited liability who can claim to have zero wealth.
6renegotiating his contract. The possibility of this extraction gives the manager an incentive
to misreport downward the realized output of the ￿rm in the second subperiod in order to
maximize the amount of resources invested in the ￿rm. The threat of this extraction by the
manager provides a reason for the outside investors to monitor in the second subperiod and
thereby reduce the extent of expropriable resources left in the ￿rm.
Monitoring: Monitoring is being done here to a⁄ect the reporting decision of the man-
ager. Because the monitors can always claim a lack of funds to pay the ￿xed cost of moni-
toring, they must have an incentive to monitor. This incentive to monitor comes from the
gap in their expected receipts if they monitor, relative to their receipts if they don￿ t. As we
will discuss in more detail below, the allocation of the claims for the two payments coming
out of the ￿rm - the interim payment in the second subperiod and the residual payment
in the third subperiod - will a⁄ect the nature of this incentive issue for the monitors. We
will show that stochastic monitoring is generally e¢ cient relative to deterministic monitor-
ing. However, since any reports by the manager are public and it is di¢ cult to observe the
randomization by the monitors, we will assume that they have to be precisely indi⁄erent
between monitoring and not for all interior randomizations. This requirement will make
satisfying the incentive constraint of the monitors nontrivial.
2.0.1 Contracting
Contracting between the outside investors and the manager is complicated by the fact that
both parties have incentive issues. Because the outside investors in their role as monitors
also have an incentive constraint, the standard revelation principal argument does not apply
to this environment. We will therefore make use of the results in Besster and Strausez
(2001) (BS), who extend the revelation principal to environments in which the principal
cannot fully commit to construct the contracting problem of the monitors. BS show that
the optimal outcome can be supported by a direct mechanism in which truthful revelation
is an optimal response but not necessarily the only equilibrium response that occurs with
positive probability. Nontruthful responses are part of the optimal arrangement as they help
to satisfy the incentive constraint of the principal (here the investors/monitors).
It is key to note here that BS￿ s result is not that all of the outcomes from an arbitrary
mechanism can be supported, but rather to show that all of the payo⁄s on the frontier of
the Pareto frontier can be supported. This lack of full equivalence will lead us to construct
an alternative mechanism which supports the same payo⁄s in order to generate a "nice"
contract.
When we allow the outside investors to commit to all aspects of the contract, in particular
7the monitoring probability, the revelation principal applies to our environment. Hence, in
the commitment case, we will restrict attention to the truth-telling equilibrium of a direct
mechanism.
In determining the e¢ cient contract, we will treat the investors/monitors as the principal.
The contract between the outside investors and the manager can be described as follows. A
contract between these parties speci￿es an amount ￿ to be invested up front, a probability of
monitoring by the outside investors m; a payment from the manager to the outside investors
in the second sub-period v; and a payment x to the manager in the third sub-period.
The monitoring probability is a function of the manager￿ s announcement ^ ￿ 2 ￿ of the
output of the project in the second sub-period, and we denote it by m(^ ￿). The payments
v from the manager to the outside investors in the second sub-period are contingent on the
manager￿ s announcement of the output level ^ ￿ as well as the outcome of the monitoring
decision. Let v0(^ ￿) denote the payment that the manager makes to the outside investors in
the second sub-period as a function of the announcement ^ ￿ in case monitoring does not take
place, and let v1(^ ￿;￿) denote the payment that the manager makes as a function both of
the announcement ^ ￿ and the true value of ￿ in case monitoring does take place. Finally, let
xi(^ ￿;￿) denote the payment from the outside investors to the manager in the third sub-period
as a function of his report ^ ￿ in the second sub-period and the realized output ￿; where i = 0
denotes the case in which monitoring did not take place and i = 1 denotes that in which it
did. A reporting strategy for the manager r is a probability distribution over ￿ conditional
on the realized output level ￿; r(^ ￿;￿) 2 4(￿)￿￿: r(^ ￿;￿) is the probability that a manager
of type ￿ makes a report ^ ￿:
The restriction that all funds paid out either come from funds invested up front, or output
leads to the following restrictions on the contract. The liquid funds invested up front must
be positive, or
￿ ￿ 0: (1)
The interim payments cannot exceed the total reported resources if monitoring doesn￿ t take
place and the total actual resources if it does, hence
v0(^ ￿) ￿ ^ ￿ + ￿; (2)
v1(^ ￿;￿) ￿ ￿ + ￿: (3)
The wage payment to the manager cannot be negative
xi(^ ￿;￿) ￿ 0; for i = 0;1: (4)
8The manager cannot claim to have an output level which would require him to payout more
than he has available if monitoring doesn￿ t occur, or
h
￿ + ￿ ￿ v0(^ ￿)
i
r(^ ￿;￿) ￿ 0: (5)
We can think of this last restriction as arising from the fact that he must demonstrate that
he has the funds to make the reported payment. Restrictions (2-5) are assumed to hold for
all ^ ￿; ￿ 2 ￿:
We will assume, without loss of generality, that xi(^ ￿;￿) is chosen to be renegotiation
proof.8 This assumption implies a constraint on x0(^ ￿;￿) and x1(^ ￿;￿) that9
x0(^ ￿;￿) ￿ ￿(￿ + ￿ ￿ v0(^ ￿)) and
x1(^ ￿;￿) ￿ ￿(￿ + ￿ ￿ v1(^ ￿;￿)) for all ^ ￿;￿: (6)
With respect to the incentive constraints on the manager, we will require that truth-
telling is a best response
m(￿)u(x1(￿;￿)) + (1 ￿ m(￿))u(x0(￿;￿))
￿ m(^ ￿)u(x1(^ ￿;￿)) + (1 ￿ m(^ ￿))u(x0(^ ￿;￿)) for all ^ ￿;￿ 2 ￿: (7)
We will also require that all reports given with positive probability do as well as truth-telling
0 =
"
m(^ ￿)u(x1(^ ￿;￿)) + (1 ￿ m(^ ￿))u(x0(^ ￿;￿))
￿m(￿)u(x1(￿;￿)) + (1 ￿ m(￿))u(x0(￿;￿))
#
r(^ ￿;￿)
for all ^ ￿;￿ 2 ￿: (8)
The long-term funds invested in the ￿rm are implicitly given by the maximum of
xi(^ ￿;￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ vi(^ ￿;￿);
8This constraint is closely related to the no-perks constraint in AC. Their constraint was motivated by
the notion that managers could misuse funds for their private bene￿t (perks), and the no-perks constraint
was imposed to ensure that they did not do so.
9If we had assumed instead that liquid funds were not subject to lossing the fraction ￿ of their value, but
that instead the interim payment was made ￿rst with liquid funds ￿ (as the manager would prefer), then the
condition would be xi ￿ ￿ minf[￿ ￿ (vi ￿ ￿)];[￿ ￿ vi]g: This di⁄ers from the condition we impose only in
that the amount that the manager can extract has an upper bound. Alternative if the output of the ￿rm was
used ￿rst, then the appropriate condition, xi ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ vi); would be even less stringent. However, imposing
either of these alternative conditions does not substantively change the qualitative results.
9where this maximum is over i = 0;1, ￿ and reports ^ ￿: Since these funds are assumed to have
zero net cost, their magnitude does not impact on the contracting problem. The liquid funds
￿ invested in the ￿rm are costly and the only reason for investing in this form is to raise the
interim payments high enough for low output levels to motivate monitoring
2.0.2 Monitoring Incentives
To make monitoring self-enforcing, it is necessary that the net expected payment be equal
to zero if m(^ ￿) 2 (0;1); nonnegative if m(^ ￿) = 1 and nonpositive if m(^ ￿) = 0. However, the
net expected gain depends upon how the claims to output are distributed among the outside
investors. In particular, it matters whether or not the second sub-period and the third
sub-period claims can be thought of as being held by one joint investor, or by two separate
investors each holding only one of these claims (and of course all the convex combinations
in between). To see this why this is the case, consider the net payout in two extreme cases
in which (i) an investor held all of the claims and (ii) one investor (the monitor) held the
claims to second sub-period payouts and a second investor held the claims to third sub-period
payouts:









since the agency cost will lose them at most only the fraction ￿ of what is not paid out
in the second sub-period.









since now the holders to the claim on the second sub-period payment will lose the full
amount of anything they don￿ t collect in this period.
The allocation of claims and the decision making process for the monitoring will determine
the nature of the expectation condition that prevails. For example, if the monitors held the
fraction ￿ of debt claims and 1 ￿ ￿ of equity claims in his portfolio, selling the fraction ￿ of








[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿] ￿ ￿; (9)
10assuming that the agency friction binds. By varying ￿ between 0 and 1, one can generate an
expected gain anywhere between the two extremes of unseparated and separated claims. In
what follows, we will restrict attention to simple conditions of this form.10
We treat a contract as being self-enforcing if there exists a ￿ 2 [￿;￿=￿] such that for all
^ ￿ 2 ￿, the expected di⁄erential between monitoring and not monitoring is (i) equal to ￿ if the
monitoring probability is interior or the nonmonitoring payment is positive, (ii) greater than
or equal to ￿ if it is occurring with probability one, and (iii) the expected di⁄erential is less
than or equal to ￿ when monitoring is taking place with probability 0 and the nonmonitoring









￿ 0 if m(^ ￿) = 1
= 0 if m(^ ￿) 2 (0;1)
￿ 0 if m(^ ￿) = 0
(10)
where ￿ 2 [￿;￿=￿]; for any ^ ￿ for which reports occur with positive probability. We will show
below that it is always weakly e¢ cient to have separated claims since it implies that the
incentive constraint on the monitoring is less binding on the e¢ cient contract.11
Note that we are free to assign beliefs to induce monitoring for any reports which occur
with zero probability. This is because it is possible to construct contracts which are arbi-
trarily close in terms of payo⁄s in which these beliefs are pinned down by the strategy of the
manager. We discuss this brie￿ y below.
10With completely unseperated claims, if the agency friction does not bind then there would be no gap
for which the loss was equal to ￿. With completely seperated claims, it does not matter whether the agency
friction binds, since the residual payment is not going to the monitor. For interior ￿, if the agency friction





￿ v0(^ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿;
which would lead to a stronger condition. However, both this version and (9) coincide for ￿ = 1: Since we
show that complete seperation is always e¢ cient even under this loose interpretation of self-enforcement, it
follows that it would hold under the alternative stricter interpretation discussed here.
11After the announcement of ^ ￿, the outside investors cannot renegotiate the nonmonitoring payment v0
and the workers contracted wage. We rationalize this by noting that unlike the wage renegotiation that
occurs in the third subperiod, this renegotiation is taking place in the second subperiod under incomplete
information. Hence, the beliefs of the negotiating parties can respond to the fact that an o⁄er to renegotiate
is made, and since such an o⁄er is an out of equilibrium move, their beliefs are not pinned down by the
equilibrium of the model. It is therefore easy to construct beliefs such that an o⁄er to renegotiate at this
stage will never be fruitful.
For example, continue to assume that the manager has all the negotiating power, and hence the outside
investors have no incentive to try and renegotiate. Then note that if the beliefs of the outside investors
about ￿ respond to an o⁄er to renegotiate on the part of the manager by increasing by more than ￿ plus the
o⁄er, then the o⁄er will always make them want to monitor for sure.
112.0.3 The E¢ cient Contract
Taking ￿ as given, the problem of determining the e¢ cient contract can be written as choos-







￿ ￿ m(^ ￿)
h
x1(^ ￿;￿) + ￿
i
￿(1 ￿ m(^ ￿))x0(^ ￿;￿)
)
r(^ ￿;￿)p(￿) ￿ ￿￿ (11)
subject to the feasibility conditions (1-5), the renegotiation proof constraint on xi; (6), the
incentive constraint that truth-telling is a best response, (7), the best response constraint on
other reports given with positive probability, (8), the monitoring incentive constraint (10),






m(^ ￿)u(x1(^ ￿;￿)) + (1 ￿ m(^ ￿))u(x0(^ ￿;￿))
i
r(^ ￿;￿)p(￿) ￿ U0: (12)
This is a complicated problem, so we will attack it in stages. First, we will restrict
ourselves to deterministic monitoring and show that under certain conditions the e¢ cient
solution assuming that the outside investors can commit with respect to monitoring can be
supported as a self-enforcing contract. Hence, the deterministic case generates the same
sort of debt and equity structure as in AC. Then we will consider the e¢ cient contract with
stochastic monitoring; ￿rst with and then without commitment. We will show that the com-
mitment contract can not generally be supported when we impose the incentive constraint on
the monitors. In addition, we will show that the e¢ cient contract with stochastic monitoring
can be mapped into an equivalent contract that looks very much like a standard debt and
equity claims on the ￿rm.
2.1 Deterministic Monitoring
Deterministic monitoring is a useful benchmark both because it has typically been assumed
within the literature and it is simpler. With deterministic monitoring we are simply adding
the requirement that m(￿) 2 f0;1g to our programming problem. We start ￿rst with the
case in which the outside investors can commit.
2.1.1 Commitment
If we assume that the monitors can commit with respect to their monitoring decision, we
are dropping the enforcement constraint (10). Since in this case the standard revelation
12principal applies, we can restrict ourselves to a truthtelling equilibrium in which r(￿;￿) = 1
and r(^ ￿;￿) = 0 for all ^ ￿ 6= ￿: In addition, since inclusion of costly liquid funds ￿ is to
help motivate the monitors to monitor, it follows that with commitment ￿ = 0; and the
problem collapses down to being a simpli￿ed version of the contracting problem considered
in AC. They showed that the e¢ cient contract had the following properties (except for sixth
property since they didn￿ t include ￿).
Proposition 2.1. There is an e¢ cient contract with the following properties:
1. v1(^ ￿;￿) = ￿ for all ^ ￿ 2
n
^ ￿ 2 ￿ : m(^ ￿) = 1
o
;
2. v0(^ ￿) = ￿
￿ for all ^ ￿ 2
n





^ ￿jm(^ ￿) = 0
o
;
3. m(^ ￿) = 1 for all ^ ￿ < ￿
￿;
4. for ^ ￿ 6= ￿; x1(^ ￿;￿) = 0 if ^ ￿ < ￿
￿ and x0(^ ￿;￿) = ￿(￿ ￿ ￿
￿) if ￿ > ￿
￿;
5. the equilibrium payments to the manager have the form xi(￿;￿) = w(￿) for i = 1;2;
where w(￿) = maxf ￿ w;￿(￿ ￿ ￿)g, and
6. ￿ = 0:
Proof: See Atkeson and Cole (2005).
In their proof, AC noted that condition (1) and (4) made the punishments as large as
possible given (2): They then noted that given (4); one never wanted to tell a lie that lead to
monitoring, and that that making v0(^ ￿) as large as possible weakly relaxed the renegotiation
proofness (their no-perks) constraint. However, since min
n




￿; it followed that the best misreport would be ￿
￿ and this potential misreport would
determine the extent to which the no-perks constraint bound in equilibrium. Therefore,
there was no gain to raising v0(￿) above ￿
￿; hence (2) follows. Then they noted that any
monitoring above ￿
￿ did not relax the incentive constraint and hence (3) follows. Given
(1) ￿ (4), it follows that the renegotiation constraint and the incentive constraint reduce to
the requirement that
u(w(￿)) ￿ u(￿(￿ ￿ ￿
￿)) for all ￿ ￿ ￿
￿: (13)
Since the manager is risk averse, it follows that compensation should be constant unless
constraint (13) binds, and this implies (5):
This characterization implies that the interim payment v0(^ ￿) looks like a debt contract
with the amount owed being ￿
￿; and the failure to pay ￿
￿ leading to monitoring and holders
13of the claim to v0(^ ￿) receiving the output of the ￿rm up to ￿
￿: Optimal compensation comes
in the form of a base wage ￿ w and a performance bonus w(￿)￿ ￿ w triggered by a high output
or pro￿t level of the ￿rm. Since ￿ w must be paid even if the output of the ￿rm is zero, we
will assume that ￿ w is invested up-front in long-term funds rather than collected at the end
from the outside investors. Given this, the claim to the residual payment in the third period
resembles equity: it pays out 0 if ￿ < ￿
￿; and ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ (w(￿) ￿ ￿ w) for ￿ ￿ ￿
￿; which is
increasing in ￿: AC show that these features emerge in a richer dynamic model.
2.1.2 Without Commitment
Here we consider trying to construct a self-enforcing contract that will be able to support
the commitment outcome under deterministic monitoring. The key to this construction is
to have the manager not give a distinct report for ￿ < ￿
￿; and hence allow the monitors to
know how much there is to be recovered if monitoring doesn￿ t occur. The other element in
altering the original contract is not to punish appropriate misreporting. If in the e¢ cient
contract (with commitment)
E f￿j￿ < ￿
￿g ￿ ￿; (14)
then we will be able to completely replicate the commitment contract. If however the in-
equality (14) does not hold, we will need to put in costly liquid funds ￿ into the project
or raise ￿
￿: This means that if (14) does not hold the self-enforcing version of this contract
will have a lower payo⁄ than the commitment version. The additional investment ￿ (or the
required change in ￿
￿) is made as small as possible by setting ￿ to it￿ s lowest possible value,
￿; and this is achieved by having complete separation of claims in which the monitors have
implicitly sold o⁄ all of their claims to the third subperiod payment.
If condition (14) holds, then the e¢ cient contract with commitment self-enforcing takes
the following form:
1. r(0;￿) = 1 if ￿ < ￿
￿ and 0 o.w.,
2. x1(^ ￿;￿) = ￿ w if ^ ￿ < ￿
￿ and ￿ < ￿
￿; and x0(^ ￿;￿) = max(￿ w;￿(^ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿))
3. ￿ = 0:
4. v1(^ ￿;￿) = ￿ if ^ ￿ < ￿









14To understand this contract, note that (1) is asking the manager to report 0 if ￿ < ￿
￿;
and (2) is promising him the same compensation that he received under the commitment
contract if he does so. Since the manager is being treated the same for any report ^ ￿ < ￿
￿
(when ￿ < ￿
￿); he is indi⁄erent over these reports. If ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ note that the manager does
at least weakly better by telling the truth. Hence the suggested reporting strategy is a best
response for the manager.
To understand why the monitors have the correct incentives, note that the monitors only
know that ￿ < ￿
￿ when they receive a report of 0. Hence, their expect return from monitoring
is E f￿j￿ < ￿
￿g ￿ ￿: For reports ^ ￿ 2 (0;￿
￿); which occur with probability 0, the expected
return of the monitors is not pinned down by the actions of the manager and we are free to
set their expectation equal to ￿ if they receive such a report. Given this, the monitors at
least weakly prefer to monitor for any report ^ ￿ < ￿
￿: Since the expected payment to debt
is ￿
￿ regardless of whether or not monitoring takes place for any truthful report ￿ ￿ ￿
￿; the
monitors strictly prefer not to monitor for reports ^ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿. This establishes that monitoring
is self-enforcing.
Misreporting by the manager is an important component in achieving the e¢ cient out-
come. If all managers were compelled to truthfully report their output levels, then no
monitoring for output levels below ￿ could be supported. But in this case, the best lie would
always be to report 0, and hence there would be no gain from monitoring, and monitoring
would be set to 0. This zero-monitoring outcome is only avoided because of the misreporting
of the manager.
When condition (14) doesn￿ t hold, then ￿ will need to be positive in order to generate
the same outcome (modulo the cost of these funds ￿￿): This will induce a trade-o⁄ between
monitoring more (i.e. raising ￿
￿) and making ￿ positive. Taking ￿
￿ as given, we need to
make the following changes to the contract relative to that when (14) holds:
3￿ . ￿ = max[￿ ￿ E f￿j￿ < ￿
￿g;0]:
4￿ . v1(^ ￿;￿) = ￿ + ￿ if ^ ￿ < ￿
￿ and v1(^ ￿;￿) = ￿
￿ + ￿ o.w.and
v0(^ ￿) =
(
^ ￿ if ^ ￿ < ￿
￿
￿
￿ + ￿ o.w.
:
Note that when ^ ￿ < ￿
￿; monitoring occurs and everything is paid out, and when ^ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿;
monitoring does not take place and ￿
￿ + ￿ is paid out. Hence in equilibrium the amount
left in the ￿rm when monitoring does not occur is given by ￿ ￿￿
￿: This in turn implies that
putting in the liquid funds never e⁄ects the manager￿ s ability to renegotiate his wage. Thus,
15the only cost of these liquid funds is their lower return. This will not be true when we turn
to stochastic monitoring because the nonmonitoring payment of ^ ￿ will be occurring with
positive probability for ^ ￿ < ￿
￿.
When condition (14) doesn￿ t hold and the manager reports ^ ￿ < ￿
￿; the debt contract is
no longer taking everything that the manager says he has in order to generate a larger gap
between the monitoring and no monitoring payments via the additional funds ￿: However, by
expanding the set of possible reports, one can restore this property. Consider the following
contract in which ￿ is expanded to include ￿￿: With this expansion, we have the manager
report ^ ￿ = ￿￿ if ￿ < ￿
￿; and we can set v0(^ ￿) = ^ ￿ +￿ for all ^ ￿ < ￿
￿ so the manager is paying
out everything he says he has. When the manager reports ^ ￿ = ￿￿ and has ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ he is paid
￿ w: When we construct a "nice" contract in section 2.2.3, this is the route we will take.
While we have treated the beliefs of the monitors with respect to the reports not made in
equilibrium; ^ ￿ 2 (0;￿
￿); as a free variable, if ￿ w > ￿￿, we can construct a minor permutation of
this arrangement that pins them down. Start ￿rst with the case in which E f￿j￿ < ￿
￿g > ￿:
We construct the revised reporting strategy of the manager as follows. For each output
￿ 2 (0;￿
￿) and ~ ￿ = minf￿
0 : ￿
0 > ￿ + ￿g we select the probabilities that ￿ tells the truth  1
and the probability  2 that type ~ ￿ reports ￿ so that
 2
 1 +  2
h
~ ￿ ￿ ￿
i
= 0
and  1 +  2 =  : So long as   is su¢ ciently small, then none of our types is being asked
to change the probability of his misreporting by an infeasible degree and the condition
expectation of the monitors upon receiving a report of 0 is still high enough to motivate
monitoring. However, the expected return to monitoring under the perturbed reports is
exactly ￿ for ^ ￿ 2 (0;￿
￿). The perturbed reporting strategy will lead to more monitoring.
However, as   goes to zero, the cost of this perturbation becomes arbitrarily small. Finally
note that we will have to change the compensation schedule to make the manager indi⁄erent
between truthtelling and these perturbed reports. However since ￿ w > ￿￿; none of the
reporting deviations are large enough to trigger a renegotiation of compensation.
Even if (14) is not satis￿ed, then can still apply the logic of this argument by simply
increasing ￿ by ". As   goes to 0, the required " will also go to zero. and the cost of the
permutation will again get small.
Since without commitment outside investors cannot be compelled to make further invest-
ments in the ￿rm, they will need to invest enough to insure that there are su¢ cient resources
to cover the managers compensation and the costs of monitoring for all possible ￿: Given our
compensation scheme, it follows that ￿ w + ￿ must be invested up front. However since the ￿ w
16investment is done via long-term funds, investing it up front involves no additional costs. In
contrast, the ￿ funds invested up front are costly since they are done via liquid funds.
2.1.3 Randomization Increases E¢ ciency
Here we want to illustrate how randomized monitoring can improve the e¢ ciency of the
contract. The reason that monitoring is taking place for all reports ^ ￿ 2 [0;￿
￿) is to make ￿
￿
high enough so as prevent managers with output levels ￿ > ￿
￿ from having an incentive to
misreport ￿
￿ in order to get ￿(￿ ￿ ￿
￿) instead of w(￿). However, even for a misreport of 0,
it is not necessary to set the reporting probability to one in order to deter misreporting if
￿ w > 0:
This is easiest to see in the deterministic contract with commitment. Taking as given
the wage contract w(￿), and the interim payment schedule (payout ^ ￿ if ^ ￿ < ￿
￿ and payout
￿
￿ if ^ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿); we can construct the minimal monitoring probability to support this contract
recursively. Let￿ s denote our set of outputs by ￿ = f￿0;￿1;:::;￿Ng; where ￿j < ￿j+1; ￿0 = 0;
and ￿N is the upper support, and we take ￿
￿ = ￿J: Then, m(￿j) = 0 for all j ￿ J: For each
j from J ￿1 to 0 we can construct the minimal monitoring level necessary to support w(￿
￿)
by the requirement that the probability of monitoring be just enough to deter the type who
has the most to gain from misreporting, or
m(￿j) : max
i>j
[u(w(￿i) ￿ u(￿(￿i ￿ ￿j))(1 ￿ m(￿j))] = 0:
It￿ s easy to see that the monitoring levels in this construction will be declining in j since
￿(￿i ￿ ￿j) is declining for each i; and even m(￿0) < 1 if ￿ w > 0 since w(￿) ￿ ￿ w: Hence, we
have improved on the deterministic contract with commitment by lowering the monitoring
costs associated with it.12
If we require that monitoring be self-enforcing, then constructing a stochastic monitoring
contract that improves e¢ ciency becomes more di¢ cult. To illustrate how such a contract
can be constructed, start from our deterministic self-enforcing contract for the case in which
E f￿j￿ < ￿
￿g > ￿ (which implies that ￿ = 0) and ￿ w ￿ ￿￿. Consider an alterative mechanism
in which we partitioning the interval f￿0;:::;￿J￿1g into f￿0;:::;￿Ig and f￿I+1;:::;￿J￿1g; where
E f￿j￿ ￿ ￿Ig ￿ ￿: Managers with output ￿ ￿ ￿I still report output of 0 and are monitored
with probability 1, and receive compensation ￿ w: Managers with output ￿ 2 f￿I+1;:::;￿J￿1g
report output ￿ ￿ ￿; and hence payout ￿ ￿ ￿ if they aren￿ t monitored, and ￿ if they are
monitored. (This may require expanding the type space ￿ to include these probability
12Boyd and Smith (1994) have argued in an numerical example that the gains from stochastic monitoring
are small. However this example suggests that they can be made quite large.
17zero types). Note that with this interim payout schedule, any monitor who receives one of
these reports is by construction just indi⁄erent between monitoring and not. Note also that
since ￿ w > ￿￿; the types that make these misreports cannot renegotiate their wage contract
upwards. We are then free to set the monitoring probabilities for these types so as to just
prevent any higher output type from misreporting this output level. This will allow us to
economize on the monitoring costs for all ￿ 2 f￿I+1;:::;￿J￿1g:
If ￿ w < ￿￿ then these types that misreport downwards will be able to renegotiate their
wage up to ￿￿ if monitoring does not take place. In which case, the compensation schedule
will have to be changed to keep them indi⁄erent, or
u(￿￿)(1 ￿ m(￿ ￿ ￿)) + u(x1(￿ ￿ ￿;￿))m(￿ ￿ ￿) = u(￿ w);
and their consumption when they aren￿ t monitored, ￿￿; is higher than their consumption
when they are monitored, x1(￿ ￿ ￿;￿) < ￿ w; though as m(￿ ￿ ￿) ! 1; x1(￿ ￿ ￿;￿) ! ￿ w:
This consumption gap is ine¢ cient, and will imply that their expect level of compensation
will be higher than before. As a result, there is now a cost associated with reducing the
extent of monitoring coming from the fact that the equilibrium level of consumption is not




(1 ￿ m(￿ ￿ ￿))[￿￿ ￿ ￿ w ￿ ￿] + m(￿ ￿ ￿)[x1(￿ ￿ ￿;￿) ￿ ￿ w]:
Note that making ￿ as small as possible helps to reduce the consumption distortions, and
shrinks the necessary level of the bottom partition, ￿ ￿ ￿I; where monitoring is taking place
with probability one.13
2.2 Stochastic Monitoring
In this section we characterize the e¢ cient contract with self-enforcing stochastic monitoring.
We will ￿rst consider the case of stochastic monitoring with commitment.
13We have assumed that both output and liquid funds left in the ￿rm between the second and third
subperiods lose the fraction ￿ of their value if the manager quits at the beginning of the third subperiod. If
however we assumed that liquid funds were not subject to a loss if the manager quits, and if the contract
could ensure that the no-monitoring interim payment was ￿rst paid with output and then liquid funds, the
gap between v1 and v0 would be largely (if not solely) composed of liquid funds, which would imply that
there would be no wage renegotiation and the model would work like the case in which ￿ w ￿ ￿￿: (See footnote
6 for further discussion.)
182.2.1 Commitment
Just as in the deterministic case with commitment, here too the standard revelation principal
applies, and we can restrict ourselves to a truthtelling equilibrium in which r(￿;￿) = 1
and r(^ ￿;￿) = 0 for all ^ ￿ 6= ￿: The problem becomes one of maximizing (11) subject to
the feasibility conditions (1-5), the renegotiation proof constraint on xi; (6), the incentive
constraint that truth-telling is a best response, (7). We have dropped both the best response
constraint on other reports given with positive probability, (8), and the monitoring incentive
constraint (10). We characterize the solution to this contracting problem in the following
propositions.
Proposition 2.2. There is an e¢ cient contract with the following properties:
1. v1(^ ￿;￿) = ￿ and v0(^ ￿) = ^ ￿ for all ^ ￿ < ￿
￿ ￿ minf￿ 2 ￿ : m(￿) = 0g and v0(^ ￿) = ￿
￿ for
all ￿ ￿ ￿
￿;
2. x1(^ ￿;￿) = 0 and x0(^ ￿;￿) = ￿(￿ ￿ v0(^ ￿)) for ￿ 6= ^ ￿;
3. x0(￿;￿) = x1(￿;￿);
4. m(￿) = 0 for all ￿ ￿ ￿
￿; and
5. ￿ = 0:
Proof: The proof of this proposition is essentially the same as in the deterministic case. To
prove part (1), note that v1 and v0 only show up in the renegotiation constraint (6), and that
increasing their values to the maximum extent allowed by the limited liability constraints
(2) and (3) relaxes the renegotiation constraint. Hence, it is e¢ cient to do so. However,
for reports above ￿
￿ no further relaxation is possible since the renegotiation constraint and










￿ ￿ ~ ￿
i￿
= u(￿ [￿ ￿ ￿
￿]); (15)
and hence there is no further relaxation in the incentive constraint from higher payments in
the second sub-period above the level of the monitoring threshold ￿
￿. Given (1) and the fact
that it is e¢ cient to punish misreporting to the maximum feasible extent, since it will not
occur in equilibrium, (2) follows. Given (1), it follows that under truthtelling the no-perks
constraints cannot bind, and hence, ￿xing the expected utility provided to the manager in
state ￿ at y(￿); where
y(￿) = m(￿)u(x1(￿;￿)) + (1 ￿ m(￿))u(x0(￿;￿));
19any e¢ cient contract must minimize the cost of delivering this utility. In other words, it
must solve the following sub-problem
min
x0;x1
m(￿)x1 + (1 ￿ m(￿))x0 s:t: m(￿)u(x1) + (1 ￿ m(￿))u(x0) ￿ y(￿):
The concavity of u implies that this minimization is achieved with x1 = x0: Finally, given
that ￿
￿ determines the extent to which the incentive and renegotiation constraint binds, there
is no further bene￿t from monitoring for reports ^ ￿ > ￿
￿; and, since monitoring is costly, it
follows that it therefore occurs with probability zero. Q:E:D:




[￿ ￿ w(￿) ￿ ￿m(￿)]p(￿) (16)
subject to X










￿ ￿ ~ ￿
i￿
; (18)
where we use w(￿) to denote xi(￿;￿), and we have made use of (15) in (18).
Proposition 2.3. In any solution to the simpli￿ed problem:
(i) w(￿) is such that there exists a ￿ ￿ > ￿
￿ such that w(￿) = ￿ w for all ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿; and
strictly increasing thereafter,
(ii) m(￿) is weakly decreasing.
If ￿ w is strictly greater than 0, then
(iii) m(￿) < 1 and is strictly decreasing in the interior, and
(iv) ￿
￿ < max(￿):
Proof: See the Appendix.
The results with stochastic and deterministic monitoring under commitment are very sim-
ilar. The result that the stochastic monitoring schedule is strictly decreasing for all nonzero
monitoring levels becomes, under deterministic monitoring the result that the monitoring
is weakly decreasing, which implies that it is done on an interval of shock reports starting
from the lowest level. With respect to compensation, the results are somewhat more stark
with deterministic monitoring: the e¢ cient contract is completely speci￿ed by the base pay
of the manager, ￿ w and the upper support of the monitoring set ￿
￿: The reason for this dif-
ference is that in the stochastic monitoring case the e¢ cient contract optimally trades o⁄
increasing consumption and decreasing the extent of monitoring, which smooths the change
in the consumption schedule relative to deterministic monitoring.
20There is one important di⁄erence with respect to the interim payment that we associate
with debt between deterministic and stochastic monitoring. Stochastic monitoring means
that despite not paying the face value of the debt, ￿
￿; monitoring may not occur. We would
interpret this outcome as one in which the debtors and the ￿rm reached a settlement and
the gap between the announced level of the debt and the face value, ￿
￿ ￿ ^ ￿; is forgiven and
the ￿rm simply pays ^ ￿ to avoid monitoring.
2.2.2 Self-Enforcing Monitoring
Here, we construct a contracting problem to characterize the e¢ cient self-enforcing contract
taking ￿ as given. In this contracting Lagrangian, we denote the multipliers associated with
the di⁄erent constraints by ai for i = 1;:::;10; and let ^ ￿ denote the reported type. The
problem is to maximize over the choice of f￿;v0(^ ￿); v1(^ ￿;￿); xi(^ ￿;￿); m(^ ￿); r(^ ￿;￿)g for all ^ ￿
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m(￿)u(x1(￿;￿)) + (1 ￿ m(￿))u(x0(￿;￿))
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21The ￿rst constraint is the nonnegativity constraint on ￿; the next two constraints are the
feasibility constraint on the interim payments, the following two constraints are the renegoti-
ation proofness constraints on managerial consumption, the sixth constraint is the reporting
feasibility constraint, while following constraint incorporates both the incentive constraint
(a7(^ ￿;￿)) and the equal utility constraint (a8(^ ￿;￿)) for reports that are made with positive
probability. The ninth constraint is the promised utility or participation constraint. The
tenth and ￿nal constraint is the incentive constraint on the monitors. In addition, we will
have the constraints that m(^ ￿) 2 4(￿) and r(^ ￿;￿) 2 4(￿) ￿ ￿:
Next we show that the monitoring incentive constraint can only bind in one direction,
from below. This has signi￿cant implications for the nature of the e¢ cient contract. The
proof works o⁄ the fact that we can construct an alternative mechanism which relaxes the
incentive constraint on the monitors if the constraint bound from above. We will later use
this same logic to prove a key aspect of our debt/equity characterization of the e¢ cient
contract.
Lemma 1: The monitoring incentive constraint can never bind from above and hence
a10(^ ￿) ￿ 0:
Proof: Consider the following augmentation of the mechanism. Assume that there is a
report ^ ￿ for which there is a ￿ type for whom v1(^ ￿;￿) < ￿ + ￿ and r(^ ￿;￿) > 0: There are
three cases to consider:
Case 1: If ￿ + ￿ > v0(^ ￿) + ￿; then we can simply shift some of its reporting probability
to an alternative report !; where v0(!) = ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿; v1(!;￿) = ￿ + ￿; and m(!) = m(^ ￿):
This shifting will relax the incentive constraint on the monitor for report ^ ￿, which will in
turn allow v1(^ ￿;￿) to be increased towards ￿ and thereby relax the renegotiation proofness
constraint both for reports ^ ￿ and ! for type ￿:
Case 2: v1(^ ￿;￿) ￿ v0(^ ￿) = ￿ for all ￿ types for whom r(^ ￿;￿) > 0: Then we can proceed
exactly as in Case 1, except this doesn￿ t relax the monitoring incentive constraint for report
^ ￿: However, the relaxation of the renegotiation proofness constraint for the type who now
makes the new report ! still occurs.
Case 3: ￿ + ￿ ￿ v0(^ ￿) + ￿: However, it follows that there must exist a type ~ ￿ for whom
v1(^ ￿;~ ￿) ￿ v0(^ ￿) > ￿: By shifting some of the reporting probability of type ~ ￿ to the new
report !; and setting v0(!) = ~ ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿; v1(!;~ ￿) = ~ ￿ + ￿; and m(!) = m(^ ￿) we relax the
renegotiation constraint for this type and also the monitoring incentive constraint for reports
^ ￿; which allows us to increase v1(^ ￿;￿) towards ￿: (Note that case 1 and case 3 are essentially
the same, except that in case 1, ~ ￿ = ￿ and the type whose v1 payment we are increasing is
the same as the type we are shifting to the alternative message !:)
Hence, the monitoring incentive constraint never binds from above or we can improve
22upon this mechanism. However this contradicts BS￿ s result that this mechanism can support
the e¢ cient outcome. In the next section we construct such an alternative mechanism in
order to generate a "nice" contract. Q:E:D:
An implication of the one-sided binding of the monitor￿ s incentive constraint is that the
size of the incentive wedge should be made as small as possible and hence the complete
separation of claims is e¢ cient.
Proposition 2.4. It is e¢ cient to set ￿ = ￿; thereby making ￿ as small as possible.










Since we have already established that a10(^ ￿) ￿ 0; it follows that if any of the incentive
constraint on the monitors ever binds, it is e¢ cient to make ￿ as small as possible. Hence,
the complete separation of claims is always at least weakly e¢ cient. Q:E:D:
We characterize the optimal contract in more detail in the appendix. However, the key
additional point we wish to establish is the following.
Proposition 2.5. Let ￿
￿ = minf^ ￿ : m(^ ￿) = 0g: It is e¢ cient to set v0(^ ￿) = ￿
￿ +￿ if ^ ￿ is s.t.
m(^ ￿) = 0; and to set m(~ ￿) = 0 if v0(~ ￿) ￿ ￿
￿ + ￿:
Proof: Just as in the commitment case, it follows from the incentive constraint that if
m(￿) = 0; then
x0(￿;￿) ￿ ￿(￿ + ￿ ￿ min
^ ￿2f￿:m(￿)=0g
v0(^ ￿)):
Hence, there is no gain from raising v0(￿) above the minimum interim payment from reports
that do not lead to monitoring. There is a gain to making this minimum payment as large
as possible and hence equal to ￿
￿+￿: Moreover, since in this case we can set v1(￿;~ ￿) = v0(￿)
there is no problem satisfying the incentive constraint on the monitors.
To see that there is no gain to monitoring for reports that lead to a no-monitoring interim
payment v0(~ ￿) ￿ ￿
￿+￿; note that monitoring at ~ ￿ doesn￿ t relax any types incentive constraint.
Then, note that since every type ~ ￿ > ￿
￿ must receive a payo⁄ of at least u(￿(~ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿)); and
the cheapest way to deliver a given payo⁄y is to set consumption equal to u￿1(y(￿)) and not
monitor. This result also is very similar to what we saw with commitment among reports
that didn￿ t lead to monitoring. Q:E:D:
232.2.3 Nice Contract
In this section we show that the e¢ cient arrangement can be supported with a contract in
which the interim payment resembles debt and the ￿nal payment resembles equity. We will
say that the e¢ cient contract resembles debt and equity if the following properties hold:
A. for reports that can trigger monitoring, everything is taken, or v1(^ ￿;￿) = ￿ + ￿ and
v0(^ ￿) = ^ ￿ + ￿ if m(^ ￿) > 0:14
B. for high enough reports that do not trigger monitoring, a constant amount is taken
which is weakly larger than that what can trigger monitoring, or v0(^ ￿) = ￿
￿ + ￿ ￿
max
n
^ ￿ : m(^ ￿) > 0
o
+ ￿:
We will construct this alternative solution through a series of propositions. In doing so, we
will need to use a message space that is larger than the type space. This message space will
include both the manager￿ s type and a suggested monitoring probability, and the manager￿ s
type will include more types than just those in ￿:
Note that we have already established the following properties: (i) v1(^ ￿;￿) = ￿ + ￿ or
it doesn￿ t e⁄ect the solution, (ii) if we order reports by their implied no-monitoring interim
payments v0(^ ￿); then there is a cuto⁄ interim payment such that monitoring only occurs for
payments below a certain threshold and doesn￿ t for payments above that threshold, and (iii)
that it is e¢ cient to have this threshold given by ￿
￿+￿; where ￿
￿ is the smallest output report
for which there is not monitoring. So all that we need to do here is to establish property A.
In the next proposition we will construct an alternative mechanism in which we always
take everything that the manager says he has if we monitor with positive probability. Just
as in the deterministic case, this will involve allowing for negative output reports.
To understand this proposition, consider the following simple example. Consider two
output types, ￿ = 10 and ￿ = 15; and assume that their reported outputs, monitoring levels
and interim payment if not monitored were as given in the table labeled original mechanism.
Assume for simplicity that ￿ = 0: We want to construct a new mechanism in which both
of these types report as their output the amount of their interim payment if not monitored.
However, this amount is the same despite the fact that they are being monitored with
di⁄erent probabilities. So, to achieve the same outcome as before, under the new mechanism
we simply have them report both the amount of their interim payment if not monitored and
a suggested monitoring probability. Note that the scope of deviations is unchanged since
14Note that the liquid funds ￿ may not be paid out if monitoring doesn￿ t occur in order to augment the
incentive to monitor. Just as in the case with deterministic monitoring, if negative reports ^ ￿ = ￿￿ are
allowed, then we get that v0(^ ￿) = ^ ￿ + ￿ if m(^ ￿) > 0:
24lying about one￿ s suggested monitoring probability is equivalent to reporting 10 instead of 7











We will denote the new message space by ￿ and a generic message by !: Let ￿ = ~ ￿￿ ~ ￿
where
~ ￿ = ￿ [
n
￿
0 : v0(^ ￿) ￿ ￿ = ￿






￿ 2 [0;1] : m(^ ￿) = ￿ for some ^ ￿ 2 ￿
o
[ f0;1g:
Consistent with our prior notation, a reporting strategy r is a probability distribution over
￿; which we denote by r 2 4(￿) ￿ ￿; where r(!;￿) is the probability that a manager of
type ￿ makes a report !: We will denote by ^ ￿(!) the output level in the report ! and by
^ ￿(!) the suggested monitoring level.
Proposition 2.6. Given any solution to this problem, one can construct an equivalent so-
lution in which v0(!) = ^ ￿(!) + ￿ if m(^ ￿(!)) > 0:
Proof: See the Appendix.
Given this result, we will henceforth work with the alternative constructed solution in
which the amount taken when there is no monitoring is equal to the reported output level,
or v0(!) = ^ ￿(!)+￿; and managers not only report their output level but make a suggestion
as to their monitoring probability. Note that in our constructed alternative solution, for all
messages made with positive probability, m(!) = ^ ￿(!): Also, r(!;￿) = 0 for all ^ ￿(!) > ￿;
that is, managers only misreport down.
We next show that taking everything when monitoring occurs is e¢ cient by constructing
an alternative to our alternative solution in which this is the case. We have already shown
25that in the original contract if either the monitoring inventive constraint binds at report ^ ￿;
or renegotiation proofness constraint binds for type ￿ making report ^ ￿; then v1(^ ￿;￿) = ￿+￿;
and hence v1(^ ￿;￿) < ￿ + ￿ only if it doesn￿ t e⁄ect the value of the solution. So this is a
fairly limited result, and but it does make clear that the e¢ cient arrangement can have this
feature everywhere that monitoring takes place with positive probability.
The logic of the argument here is essentially the same as in Lemma 1. To understand
what is happening it is useful to consider the following simple example. In this example, we
will assume that ￿ = 2:5 and ￿ = 0: The example considers two types, ￿ = 5 and ￿ = 15
who are both reporting ! = (5;1=2) under the new mechanism constructed above. However,
v1 [(5;1=2);15] = 10; which is less than the total output of this type. This interim payment
in the case of monitoring cannot simply be adjusted up however, since doing so would raise
the expected payo⁄ from monitoring to be above ￿ = 2:5; and hence give the monitors an
incentive to monitor with probability one. To prevent this, we spit this type into two groups,
rasing the ￿rst groups interim payment and having the second group make a di⁄erent report.
This change is illustrated in the second table labeled new new mechanism. The key to note
here is that both for the message (5,1/2) and the message (15-2.5,1/2), the expected payo⁄
from monitoring is ￿ since (:1667 ￿ 10)=(:1667 + :5) = 2:5 and that this division of ￿ = 15







￿ 5 15 15
! (5,1/2) (5,1/2) (15-2.5,1/2)
# 1/2 .1667 0.3333
v1 5 15 15
Proposition 2.7. Given an alternative solution to this problem constructed along the lines
of proposition 2.6, in which v0(!) = ^ ￿(!) + ￿, there is an equivalent solution in which
v1(!;￿) = ￿ + ￿ for all ! s.t. m(!) > 0:
Proof: See the Appendix.
263 Concluding Comments
We have considered a simple model of a ￿rm which hires a manager to produce output sub-
ject to a long-run agency friction and a short-run information friction. We have allowed for
stochastic monitoring because of its ability to e¢ ciently economize on the extent of moni-
toring needed to induce the correct incentives on reporting. However, because monitoring is
ex post ine¢ cient, we have required it to be self-enforcing. We have shown that an e¢ cient
contract with self-enforcing monitoring has many of the features of standard debt and equity
claims. First, the intermediate payment has a debt like characteristic in which everything
is taken when monitoring occurs, and that it is e¢ cient to have a ￿ at payment equal to the
highest report that can trigger monitoring with positive probability for reports so high that
monitoring will not occur. However, unlike the case with deterministic monitoring, stochas-
tic monitoring by its very nature features debt forgiveness as one of its primary features;
that is, the failure to pay the face value of the debt does not automatically trigger monitor-
ing. Also, unlike the commitment case, misreporting plays an important role in sustaining
monitoring. It is only the expectation of misreports of lower output levels by the manager
that induces the monitors to monitor since under the e¢ cient contract all of the reported
output is collected if it is below a threshold level. Finally, we have shown that complete
separation of claims is e¢ cient when monitoring is self-enforcing. This provides a rationale
for the unbundling of the debt and equity payments coming out of the ￿rm.
While we have generated these results within a one period model, it is relatively straight-
forward to show that a dynamic version of this model will also have these features. AC
showed that their model, in which there was commitment by the principal and deterministic
monitoring, preserved the debt and payment features described here when one considered
an in￿nitely repeated version of their environment. The key to their result was that their
information friction is temporary, as it is here.
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4 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.3: We ￿rst form the Lagrangian, which we formulate in terms of
choosing the monitoring probabilities m(￿) and the utility level of the manager y(￿) to yield







[￿ ￿ C(y(￿)) ￿ ￿m(￿)] + ￿[y(￿) ￿ U0]
P￿
~ ￿=0 ￿(￿;~ ￿)
h
y(￿) ￿ (1 ￿ m(~ ￿))u(￿
h










where C(x) = u￿1(x); ￿ is the multiplier on the promise keeping constraint, ￿(￿;~ ￿) is the
multiplier on the incentive constraint (18) with respect to the deviation of reporting ~ ￿ given
a realization ￿; and ￿+(￿) and ￿+(￿) are the multipliers on the zero and one bounds on m(￿):
The ￿rst-order conditions for this problem are
C
0(y(￿)) = ￿ +
X









Condition (20) implies that if constraint (18) doesn￿ t bind, then y(￿) = ￿ u; and moreover that
y(￿) ￿ ￿ u for all ￿. In terms of the compensation of the manager, this implies that w(￿) = ￿ w
when the incentive constraint doesn￿ t bind, where ￿ w = C(￿ u): To see that if the constraint
binds at ￿1 and if ￿2 > ￿1; then it binds at ￿2; and moreover that w(￿1) < w(￿2); note that
29(1￿m(~ ￿))u(￿
h
￿ ￿ ~ ￿
i
) is strictly increasing in ￿; which implies that y(￿2) > y(￿1); and hence
w(￿2) = C(y(￿2)) > C(y(￿1)) = w(￿1)
which this proves (1):
To prove (2); note that condition (21) implies that if m(￿) > 0; then it must be the case
that ￿(~ ￿;￿) > 0 for some ~ ￿ > ￿; or in other words that deviating and reporting ￿ binds
on some type ~ ￿: This result implies that if we take y(￿) as given, and de￿ne for each ￿ the












if ~ ￿ < ￿
0 o.w.
; (22)
then, e¢ ciency implies that m(￿) = max~ ￿f￿￿(~ ￿)g: In other words, the probability of monitor-
ing is positive only if it binds for some type. (Note that by ￿lling in the required probabilities
with zeros we removed the need to shrink the type space that could deviate to ￿ as ￿ in-
creased.) The function ￿￿(~ ￿) is weakly decreasing in ~ ￿ for ￿xed ￿; and the sup over a set of
weakly decreasing functions is weakly decreasing.




￿ ￿ ~ ￿
i￿
￿
(1 ￿ m(￿))u(￿(sup(￿)); and that since u(￿(max(￿)) is ￿nite, the rhs goes to zero as m(￿)
goes to one. Hence, m(￿) < 1 for all ￿:
To prove that m is strictly decreasing in the interior when ￿ has ￿nite upper support,
assume that the reverse was true. That is, assume that for ￿ 2 [￿1;￿2]; m(￿) = a; where
0 < a < 1 and ￿2 ￿ ￿1 > 0: Then, note that since for all ￿nite ~ ￿ > ￿1;
(1 ￿ a)u(￿
h
~ ￿ ￿ ￿1
i
) > (1 ￿ a)u(￿
h
~ ￿ ￿ min(￿2;￿)
i
);
which implies that ~ ￿ strictly prefers to report min(￿2;￿) over ￿1; and this contracts our earlier
result that monitoring is only positive if it binds for some type, since monitoring is positive
at ￿1 and it does not bind there.
To prove (iv); note that the incentive constraint (18) implies that if ￿ w > ￿(￿ ￿ ^ ￿); then
deviating and making a report of ^ ￿ can only lower the payo⁄ of the manager. Hence, for all
￿ such that ￿(sup(￿)￿￿) < ￿ w; monitoring is unnecessary and will optimally be set to zero.
Note that since w(￿) ￿ ￿ w; the interval over which m(￿) = 0; may be substantially larger
than this simple bound would imply. Q:E:D:
Discussion of ￿rst-order conditions:
30Here we characterize the e¢ cient contract using the ￿rst-order conditions. The ￿rst-order
condition for ￿ is given by









a3(^ ￿;￿) + a6(^ ￿)r(^ ￿;￿)
￿￿a4(^ ￿;￿) ￿ ￿a5(^ ￿;￿)
#
= 0









￿a3(^ ￿;￿) + ￿a5(^ ￿;￿) + a10(^ ￿)r(^ ￿;￿)p(￿) = 0:
To understand these conditions, note ￿rst that putting in liquid funds is costly and hence
￿ > 0 implies that the limited liability constraints on the size of v0(^ ￿) and v1(^ ￿;￿); and the
reporting constraint bind su¢ ciently. Then, note that if the limited liability constraint on
v0 binds, then a2(^ ￿) > 0 and v0(^ ￿) = ^ ￿ + ￿: Similarly if the limited liability constraint on v2
binds, then a3(^ ￿;￿) > 0 and v1(^ ￿;￿) = ￿ + ￿: If the renegotiations constraints bind (a4(^ ￿;￿)
and a5(^ ￿;￿)) this promotes v0(^ ￿) = ^ ￿ + ￿ and v1(^ ￿;￿) = ￿ + ￿ respectively. If r(^ ￿;￿) = 0; it
is always e¢ cient to set v1(^ ￿;￿) = ￿+￿: Similarly, if the sum over ^ ￿ of r(^ ￿;￿)p(￿) is equal to
zero (the report ^ ￿ is not made with positive probability) it is e¢ cient to set v0(^ ￿) = ^ ￿ + ￿:
One factor weighting against setting v0(^ ￿) = ^ ￿ + ￿ and v1(^ ￿;￿) = ￿ + ￿ is the incentive
constraint on the monitors and its multiplier a10(^ ￿): If the monitoring incentive binds and
a10(^ ￿) > 0; it follows that a3(^ ￿;￿) > 0 (in which case a5(^ ￿;￿) = 0) and v1(^ ￿;￿) = ￿ + ￿: If
a10(^ ￿) = 0 and the renegotiation proofness constraints a5(^ ￿;￿) doesn￿ t bind, only then may
it be the case that v1(^ ￿;￿) < ￿+￿: So, we get that either v1(^ ￿;￿) = ￿+￿ or it doesn￿ t matter
for the solution.
For v0(^ ￿); if a10(^ ￿) > 0 and r(^ ￿;￿)p(￿) > 0 for some (^ ￿;￿); it follows that the renegotiation
proofness constraint must bind for some type making the report of ^ ￿ with positive probability,
and hence for this type v0(^ ￿) < ￿ + ￿:
We turn next to characterizing consumption for the manager. We will assume that the
utility constraint binds and hence a9 > 0: De￿ne ￿ w by u0(￿ w) = 1=a9: Then, note that the
￿rst-order conditions on x0(￿;￿) and x1(￿;￿) (that is, when the agent tells the truth) are
31respectively given by
0 = [a9u




































With commitment, the renegotiation proofness constraint could never bind on the e¢ cient
contract for truthful reports, else one could simply raise v0(￿) and v1(￿;￿) to relax these
constraints. Here it can bind with respect to x0(￿;￿), because the incentive constraint
on the monitors could prevent v0(￿) from being raised. If the incentive, best response and
renegotiation proof constraints don￿ t bind, then xi(￿;￿) = ￿ w; just as under commitment, and
if they do bind, then xi(￿;￿) > ￿ w: Note that for the lowest type, ￿ = 0; the renegotiation
constraint can never bind, and hence w(0;0) = ￿ w:





0(x0(^ ￿;￿)) ￿ 1
i
(1 ￿ m(^ ￿))r(^ ￿;￿)p(￿) + a4(^ ￿;￿)







































For the case of misreports, the incentive constraint can bind, i.e. a7(^ ￿;￿) > 0; and this
factor promotes setting x0(^ ￿;￿) and x1(^ ￿;￿) as low as possible. The best response condition
binds in the opposite direction and can force up x0(^ ￿;￿) and x1(^ ￿;￿) so that the manager￿ s
32payo⁄ is equal to that from reporting the truth. Note that if r(^ ￿;￿) = 0; then just as in the
commitment case, it is e¢ cient to set x1(^ ￿;￿) = 0; and x0(^ ￿;￿) as low as possible.










a7(^ ￿;￿) ￿ a8(^ ￿;￿)r(^ ￿;￿)
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u(x0(^ ￿;￿)) ￿ u(x1(^ ￿;￿))
i
r(^ ￿;￿)p(￿):
We￿ re being a bit loose here since we should also include multipliers on the constraints that
1 ￿ m(^ ￿) ￿ 0 and sum to one. If, as in the commitment case, x0(^ ￿;￿) = x1(^ ￿;￿) for all








where we￿ ve made use of our result that x1(^ ￿;￿) = 0 if r(^ ￿;￿) = 0 (and u(0) = 0 by assump-
tion). Just as in the commitment case, this expression implies that optimal monitoring is
being chosen to dissuade misreporting, and for interior monitoring choices m(^ ￿) is set just
low enough to discourage misreporting. Moreover, the type that binds is the one in which
x0(^ ￿;￿) is the largest, which is the highest ￿ type who is not suppose to make the report ^ ￿
since x0(^ ￿;￿) = ￿(￿ ￿ v0(^ ￿)):
However, if there is some ￿ type who is being asked to misreport his type as ^ ￿ with
positive probability and for whom x0(^ ￿;￿) 6= x1(^ ￿;￿); then monitoring also e⁄ects the degree
to which the manager￿ s consumption is being distorted. Note that since v1(^ ￿;￿) = ￿ in this
case, it follows that x0(^ ￿;￿) > x1(^ ￿;￿) since the wage renegotiation condition can only bind
when there is no monitoring.







x1(^ ￿;￿) + ￿
i





m(￿)u(x1(￿;￿)) + (1 ￿ m(￿))u(x0(￿;￿))









v1(^ ￿;￿) ￿ v0(^ ￿) ￿ ￿
i
p(￿)@￿ + a11(^ ￿;￿);
where we have added the multiplier a11(^ ￿;￿) to take account of the additional condition that
r(^ ￿;￿) sum to one over ^ ￿￿ s. We have also made use of the fact that since the multiplier on
the reporting constraint can only bind if the constraint holds, it follows that
a6(^ ￿;￿)
h
￿ + ￿ ￿ v0(^ ￿)
i
= 0:
This derivative may be positive or negative if r(^ ￿;￿) is equal to one or zero respectively, and
is equal to zero if it is interior.
Next, note that if the wage renegotiation constraints don￿ t bind at (^ ￿;￿) and (￿;￿)
xi(^ ￿;￿) = x0(￿;￿) for i = 0;1 and x0(￿;￿) = x1(￿;￿): In this case, misreporting is only
costly to the extent that m(^ ￿) > m(￿), and is bene￿cial to the extent that a8(^ ￿) > 0 and
￿ > ^ ￿: However, the bigger the misreport in the sense of ￿ > ^ ￿, the greater the extent
to which the wage renegotiation constraint will bind when monitoring doesn￿ t occur since
v0(^ ￿) is constrained to be less than ^ ￿: In this case, misreporting has the additional costs of
distorting consumption.
Consider reports which don￿ t lead to monitoring, m(^ ￿) = 0; in which case, the derivative
with respect to the reporting probability simpli￿es to
@L
@r(^ ￿;￿)
= ￿x0(^ ￿;￿)p(￿) ￿ a8(^ ￿;￿)
h






p(￿) + a10(^ ￿)
h
v1(^ ￿;￿) ￿ v0(^ ￿) ￿ ￿
i
p(￿)@￿ + a11(^ ￿;￿):
If m(￿) = 0 as well, then x0(￿;￿) = x0(^ ￿;￿) from the combined implications of the incentive
and the equal utility constraints. It then follows that since there are no gains from misre-
porting at ^ ￿ with positive probability, it is e¢ cient to set v1(^ ￿;￿) = v0(^ ￿) and thereby satisfy
the monitoring incentive constraint (which implies that a10(^ ￿) = 0).
Proof of Proposition 2.6: Starting from any solution to the contracting problem above, we
can construct an alternative mechanism
n
~ ￿; ~ vi; ~ xi; ~ m; ~ r
o




v0(^ ￿) ￿ ￿;m(^ ￿)
i￿
= v0(^ ￿):
To do this we treat a manager who has reported
h
v0(^ ￿) ￿ ￿;m(^ ￿)
i
as if he had reported ^ ￿.
34We do this ￿rst by setting
~ v0(!) = ^ ￿(!) + ￿ 8! 2 ~ ￿:
Then, we require that for all ^ ￿ 2 ￿;
~ v1(
h
v0(^ ￿) ￿ ￿;m(^ ￿)
i
;￿) = v1(^ ￿;￿);
~ m(
h
v0(^ ￿) ￿ ￿;m(^ ￿)
i
) = m(^ ￿);
~ xi(
h
v0(^ ￿) ￿ ￿;m(^ ￿)
i




v0(^ ￿) ￿ ￿;m(^ ￿)
i
;￿) = r(^ ￿;￿):
This determines all of the outcomes for all messages which are suppose to occur with positive
probability; that is, for all
! 2 ~ ￿ ￿
n
!
0 2 ~ ￿ : v0(^ ￿) ￿ ￿ = ^ ￿(!
0) and ^ ￿(!
0) = m(^ ￿) for some ^ ￿ 2 ￿
o
:
Note that if we restrict ourselves to ! 2 ~ ￿; then in each of these outcomes, all of our
conditions must be satis￿ed since they were satis￿ed in the original problem.
For all ! = 2 ~ ￿, we need to ensure that no manager makes such a report, and, if ^ ￿(!) 6= ￿;
that no manager will ever want to make such a report. To ensure that, we simply require
that
~ r(!;￿) = 0;
~ m(!) = 1;




x(￿;￿) if ^ ￿(w) = ￿
0 o.w.
Note that for all ! = 2 ~ ￿; no one is making these reports with positive probability and hence
we are free to assign beliefs to the monitor so as to ensure any desired degree of monitoring.
Since ~ v0(!) = ^ ￿(!) + ￿ and we set ~ v1(!;￿) = ￿ + ￿; we can set consumption as low as
possible for anyone who reports ! = 2 ~ ￿; and for whom the output report is not correct.
There are many ways to set ~ xi(!;￿) since anything between 0 and the truth-telling level
x(￿;￿) will su¢ ce. We have chosen somewhat arbitrarily to preserve the quality that telling
35the truth about one￿ s output is a best response (irrespective of the recommended level of
monitoring).Q:E:D:
Proof of Proposition 2.7: The basic idea of the proof is that if v1(!;￿) < ￿ + ￿ and
^ ￿(!) > 0; then we can take some of the managers who are reporting ! and for whom
￿ + ￿ ￿ v0(!;￿) > ￿; and reassign them to report [￿ ￿ ￿; ^ ￿(!)]: At this reassigned output
level, we can set v1 = ￿ + ￿ while v0 = ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿: Hence, v1 ￿ v0 = ￿ and the monitoring
self-enforcing constraint will still be satis￿ed with the inclusion of these types for a report of
[￿ ￿ ￿; ^ ￿(!)]. There is one special case that we have to deal with in which v1(!;￿)￿^ ￿(!) = ￿
for all the managers making the report of ! with positive probability. In what follows assume
that ^ ￿(!) > 0 for all the signals we consider.
First, consider the special case of an ! such that (i) for all ￿ such that r(!;￿) > 0; then
v1(!;￿)￿^ ￿(!)￿￿ = ￿, and (ii) for some ￿
0 : r(!;￿
0) > 0; and v1(!;￿
0) < ￿
0+￿: Then, we can
simply have ￿
0 report [￿
0 ￿ ￿; ^ ￿(!)] and set v1 ([￿
0 ￿ ￿; ^ ￿(!)]) = ￿
0+￿: Note that this will not
e⁄ect monitoring incentive constraint at either report ! or report [￿
0 ￿ ￿; ^ ￿(!)]; and that
this change in reporting relaxes the no-perks constraints on x0 and x1 but otherwise leaves
the objective function unchanged, while satisfying all of the constraints. Hence, it must be
weakly e¢ cient.
Next, assume that there exists a ￿
0 such that r(!;￿
0) > 0; and v1(!;￿
0) < ￿
0 + ￿ and a
￿" : r(!;￿") > 0; and v1(!;￿") ￿ ^ ￿(!) > ￿: Note that it could be that ￿
0 = ￿": Then, raise
v1(!;￿
0) towards ￿









by lowering r(!;￿") and assigning the released reporting probability for type ￿" by assigning
it to report [￿" ￿ ￿;￿(!)]; where v1(￿"￿￿;￿(!);￿") = ￿"+￿: Just as before, this change in
reporting relaxes the no-perks constraint on x1(!;￿
0); x1(!;￿") and on x0(!;￿") but other-
wise leaves the objective function unchanged, while satisfying all of the constraints including
in particular the monitor incentive constraint. If the probability of type ￿" reporting ! is
exhausted before v1(!;￿
0) is raised to ￿
0; simply ￿nd another ￿" and continue the process.
Finally, note that if the incentive constraint could be satis￿ed under message ! with
monitoring probability m(!); then it can be satis￿ed for the message (￿" ￿ ￿;￿(!)) since
amount being paid out when monitoring does not occur is higher. and we are free to set the
consumption level of types who are not suppose to make this report to zero when monitoring
occurs. Hence, the incentive constraint holds strictly. Q:E:D:
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